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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, George B. Archambeau, appeals from a 
and sentence entered against him for aggravated robbery in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September 16, 1982, the Defendant was found guilty of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, by a jury, the Hc··,_:oc: 
James F. Sawaya presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of his conviction and 
order of dismissal entered or in the alternative a rcro-a:1d tc' tr.' 
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 5, 1981, a robbery occurred at Zion's 
branch, State of Utah. At approximately 1:00 p.m. in a'.tc• 
on February 5, 1981, a man entered Zion's Bank, Murra1· bi a:. ·h 
denim blue overalls and a light blue windbreaker, and a sk> 
over his face. Ms. Julie Terry, a bank teller for Zion's Bank, 
M,ir 1riy branch, and a witness who testified at trial, stated that 
u,c- suspect had a red ski mask over his face which made any 
id,,r1tification of the suspect impossible. (T-16, L-1) (T-26, L 2). 
After the robbery, and while exiting the bank, the suspect passed 
a customer of the bank by the name of Robert Cosaert who testified 
at trial that while he was walking into the bank and opening the 
outer door, the suspect was coming out of an inner door. The only 
observation made by Mr. Cosaert was an area of the face fron the 
bottom of the nose to the eyebrows with the remainder of the 
head being covered by a ski mask. (T-30). The most distinctive 
characteristic that Mr. Cbsaert was able to observe were crow's feet 
around the eyes of the suspect. (T-86, L-2,3). Approximately three 
months later, based upon the observation of a very limited area of 
the suspect's face, which lasted for just a few seconds, Mr. Cosaert 
SP!ected the photograph of Defendant from a photospread displayed 
b:; Dete•.·tive Robinson. (T-88). 
Another bank enployee also made a tentative and limited 
observation and identification of the suspect. (T-106-123). 
A former girlfriend of the Defendant testified at trial that 
the Defendant spoke of robbing banks and was in possession of a gun. 
Sht •urther testified that the Defendant displayed a photograph 
depic• iri'J a stack of money, however, on cross examination, the witness 
that her testimony was, in fact, biased. (T-67, T-68). 
The Defense, through the testimony of Mr. Bill Guy Mourer, who 
'"''s e"1plnyl'd as a cable foreman for Rocky Mountain Communication, 
prcsentcri evidence that on the date and time of the bank robbery, the 
DUe1"l,1nt WdS employed by Rocky Mountain Communication Company as a 
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cable t.v. installer. Mr. Mourer further testified that on the 
date and time of the bank robbery, Mr. Archambeau was workinq at 
the location of 3800 South and 4800 West installing a fePd l 1r,c 
for cable t.v. The Defendant never left the job site locatioc a. 
any time during the entire day. (T-171, 172, 173). 
Furthermore, another defense witness, Randy Sargent, testit 1, 
that in a conversation he had with his since deceased brother, 
Paul Watson, Mr. Watson admitted to commiting the robbery of the 
Zion's Bank on February 5, 1981. (T-157-167). 
Therefore, based upon the limited observations the State's 
witnesses were able to make of the suspect, and the testimony of 
a biased girlfriend, the Defendant, George B. Archambeau was 
guilty of the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felon;, 




A. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
It is well settled that a reviewing court has the authority 
to review a case on the sufficiency of the evidence. This stanc3' 
of review is established in State v Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (1977), wr.• 
states that: 
"In order for the Defendant to successfully 
challenge and overturn a verdict on the 
grounds of insufficiency of evidence, it must 
appear that upon so viewing the evidence, 
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed 
the crime." 565 P.2d at 68. 
In the instant case, Appellant contends that there was suf'.i::· 
evidence of Defendant being elsewhere on the date and time of the 
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commission of the offense and thus a reasonable doubt is raised. 
ln State v Mecham, 456 P.2d 156(1969), the Court specifically 
,Latecl that: 
"It is nevertheless the burden of the State 
to prove the Defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and if the evidence of 
Defendant's being elsewhere is sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt as to his being 
involved in the crime, he should be acquitted." 
456 P.2d at 158. 
In the instant case, Appellant contends that the evidence 
before the jury, presented by the defense witness, was sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt, and the jurors should not therefore, 
have found Defendant guilty. The witness, who was not related to 
the Defendant, testified as to the whereabouts of the Defendant 
during the time the robbery occurred and presented documentation 
of his testimony in the form of Defendant's employee time card. 
The defense witness, Mr. Bill Guy Mourer, testified that in February 
of 1981, he was employed as a cable foreman for a company named 
Rocky Mountain Communication Company. He also testified that during 
the first week of February, 1981, the Defendant was a member of the 
work crew supervised by him. He further testified that on the day 
of the robbery, the Defendant worked a full eight (8) hours at an 
installation site some distance from the place of the robbery and 
that during that time the Defendant never left the site. To 
corroborate this testimony, the Defense introduced into evidence the 
Ljmc card for the Defendant. 
The Appellant contends that this evidence was sufficient for 
acquittal. The witness, unrelated to the Appellant, produced not only 
testimony, but also documentation of his presence at a site, a sub-
stantial distance from the bank on the day of the robbery. The witness 
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further testified that none of the crew left the installation sq, 
on the day of the robbery. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing authority nnd fncts rr 
this case the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to fine 
the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT I. 
B. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends that his conviction in large part, wa 0 
obtained from the identifications made by State witnesses, Mr. 
Robert Cosaert and Mrs. Annette B. Cornia. Appellant further 
contends that the nature of their testimony at trial raised a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the Appellant was the person who 
robbed Zion's First National Bank on February 5, 1981. A nunber 
of factors in this case created a substantial likelihood of 
irreparable identification by the two identifying witnesses. 
Justice Brennan made this point in United States v Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 18L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967): 
"The vagaries of eye-witness identification 
are well known; the annals of criminal law 
are rife with instances of mistaken identificaticc. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: 'What is the 
worth of identification testimony even when un-
contradicted?' The identification of strangers 
is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of 
such testimony are established by a formidable 
number of instances in the records of Eng 1 i sr anj 
American trials. These instances are recent, nc' 
due to the brutalities of ancient criminal prorc:. 
The United States Supreme Court in Simmons v United 
U.S. 377 (1968) articulated the standard of reliability in rnnte:" 
photographic arrays. This Court, in light of the due process 
requirements set forth in Simmons, supra, noted the two questions 
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be considered in evaluating a misidentification claim. In State 
501 P. 2d 1084 (Utah, 1972), the Court questioned first, 
whE:lher there was justification for the procedure employed; and 
second, whether there is a chance that the procedure used would 
lead to misidentification. With regard to the second question, the 
following factors are to be considered; opportunity and length of 
time the witness had to observe the accused, the time elapsing 
between the incident and the identification. The facts in the 
present case compel the reversal of Appellant's conviction. The 
identification by Mr. Cosaert was based on his passing the suspect, 
with a ski mask covering all but the eyes and nose as the suspect 
left the bank. (T-93, 94). Additionally, his identification of a 
picture of the Appellant did not occur until two or three months 
after the day of the robbery. (T-88). These factors would hardly 
seem conducive to an accurate identification. 
The identification by Mrs. Cornia was based upon seeing a 
man walk past a window as she was walking downstairs. (T-108, 109) 
Ms. Cornia did not see the same man actually enter the bank. Nor, 
was she present on the main floor of the bank during the robbery. 
(T-117,118). Her identification of the man she saw walk past the 
window as the bank robber can hardly be considered as reliable. 
Based on the foregoing facts, neither of the eye-witness identifications 
can be considered reliable. These identifications carry with them 
the S1JLstantial likelihood of error, and a finding of guilt based on 
!his testimony deprives the Appellant of due process of law. 
Therefore, based upon the limited observations and identifications 
of the State's eye-witnesses combined with the independent corroborated 
alibi evidence presented on behalf of Appellant, the evidence adduced 
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at trial is insufficient as a matter of law to support Appel' 
conviction for the reason that it appears that upon viewi1;, ' 
evidence reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable clouhl t',r 
the Appellant committed the crime. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE. 
The Defense raised at trial was that the Appellant was 
the person who committed the aggravated robbery which was alle;e· 
in the information. The identification made of Appellant 
Cosaert was from a photographic array two to three months after 
the date of the offense. (T-88). The identification of Mrs. 
Cornia was based upon an observation which lasted for just a fe• 
seconds and which was based upon seeing a man walk past a 
as she was walking down the stairs. Mrs. Cornia did not see 
suspect actually enter the bank nor was she present on the 
floor of the bank during the course of the robbery. ( T-117,118 
As part of his defense, Appellant requested an instruction wh1:' 
described the nature and dangers inherent in identification en-JC" 
some factors to consider in assessing the value of identificat1:· 
1 
and the burden of proof with respect the defense. 
1. That instruction provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends on 
the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or not 
Defendant was the person who took personal property in the pc•ss 0 •: 
of Julie Terry on February 5, 1981, and to make a reliable ide:.·. 
cation later. 
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The trial court refused to give the instruction in full and 
,,,ception was taken. (T-225). 
The dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence 
have been the subject of discussion for many years. The 
unreliability of eyewitness identification has been well documented 
in the literature, and numerous law review articles have been 
written on the subject in recent years. 2 The commentators note 
that reasons for this unreliability are found in the problems 
that are associated with human perception and memory, both of which 
1. (continued) 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you 
should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and 
an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
the person at the time will be affected by such matters as how 
long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness 
was from the offender, how good were lighting conditions, whether 
the witness had an occasion to see or know the person in the past. 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by that 
witness subsequent to the event was a product of his or her own 
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of the 
identification, and the circumstances under which the identification 
was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced 
by the circumstances under which the Defendant was presented to him 
or her for identification, you should scrutinize the identification 
with great care. You may also consider the length of time that 
lapsPd between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity 
of the witness to see Defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability 
of lhe identification. 
2_ Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on 
the of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 
969il977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of Eyewitness 
_Ider1t!,_0cation Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461(1978); Eyewitness 
Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. L. Rev. 407 
!19801-. 
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play a vital role in eyewitness identification. 
In United States v Barber, 412 F.2d 517(3rd Cir.19711, 
the court gave a similar description of the processes 
in human observation, perception and memory. It then went or. : 
state, with respect to eyewitness identification: 
"Eyewitness identification testimony, therefore, is:· 
expression of a belief or impression by the witness. 
If there is a high degree of precision and certaint" 
in his expression, which is consistent with any 
statements and unshaken on cross-examination, the s:a·.'· 
ment of the witness may be regarded as a statement c' 
fact. If certainty is lacking, the expression is 
deemed to possess an evidentiary quality of inferior 
rank. Thus, where the circumstances surroundinc 
criminal act gave limited opportunity for observaticr 
or utilization of the sensory perception, or where 
uncertainty is expressed by the witness himself, or 
exposed by a past history of the witness' statements 
or demonstrated by cross-examination, the statement 
of identity should be considered as only an expressicc 
of opinion and should be accompanied by appropriate 
instructions as to its sufficiency and weight. Tc be 
sure, the courts have been generous in the admissior 
of eyewitness identifications in order to permit the 
jury to make its own assessment. The emphasis has 
been on inclusion of evidence, rather than exclusior.; 
on credibility, rather than admissibility". (footno:.es 
omitted) 412 F.2d at 527. 
In this case, the identification evidence that was produccc 
was one eyewitness identification and the Appellant's 
being picked out of a group of six pictures. The selection of 
Appellant's photograph did not occur until two or three months a'" 
the robbery occurred. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in 
635 P.2d 1263(Kan. 1981), discussed those general problems at J, 
which are associated with the use of eyewitness identification 
evidence. The court then took note of the particular problencs '' .· 
arise in the courtroom with that evidence. 
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"In spite of the great volume of articles on 
the subJect of eyewitness testimony by legal 
writers and the great deal of scientific research 
by psychologists in recent years, the courts 
in this country have been slow to take the 
problem seriously and, until recently, have not 
taken effective steps to confront it. The 
trouble is that many judges have assumed that 
an 'eyeball' witness, who identifies the accused 
as the criminal, is the most reliable of witnesses, 
and, if there are any questions about the identi-
fication, the jurors, in their wisdom, are fully 
capable of determining the credibility of the 
witness without special instructions from the 
court. Yet cases of mistaken identification are 
not infrequent and the problem of misidentification 
has not been alleviated. 
We note, for example, a 1979 unreported prosecution 
in Wilmington, Delaware, against Rev. Bernard T. 
Pagano, a Roman Catholic priest, accused of robbing 
six Delaware stores in the winter of 1978. At the 
trial, he was falsely identified by several state 
witnesses as the robber. After the State rested 
its case, the prosecution was dismissed on motion 
of the State because another man confessed to the 
crime. Closer to home is the case of Ronald Quick, 
who was twice tried and convicted of aggravated 
robbery of a liquor store in Hutchinson. At both 
trials two eyewitnesses positively identified 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. These 
two convictions were reversed for trial errors in 
State v Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108(1979) 
229 Kan. 117, 621 P.2d 997 (1981). The case was 
dismissed by the State during the third trial after 
another man, who looked like the defendant, confessed 
to the crime. 635 P.2d at 1241 
After considering these cases and the literature on 
the subject, we have concluded that requiring trial 
courts to admit this type of expert evidence is not 
the answer to the problem. We believe that the 
problem can be alleviated by a proper cautionary 
instruction to the jury which sets forth the factors 
to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony. 
Such an instruction, coupled with vigorous cross-
examination and persuasive argument by defense counsel 
dealing realistically with the shortcomings and troubl 
spots of the identification process, should protect 
the rights of the defendant and at the same time 
enable the courts to avoid the problems involved in 
the admission of expert testimony on this 
635 P.2d at 1243 
Th<' instruction that the Kansas court held should be given, 
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was that framed by the United States Court of Appeal for thr 
District of Columbia in United States v Telfaire, 469 F.2.-J •, 
(D.C. Cir., 1972). The Telfaire court described the need f 0 r 
such an instruction, stating: 
"The presumption of innocence that safeguards 
the common law system must be a premise that is 
realized in instruction and not merely a promise. 
In pursuance of that objective, we have pointed 
out the importance of and need for a special 
instruction on the key issue of identification, 
which emphasizes to the jury the need for f indinq 
that the circumstances of the identification are 
convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. This need 
was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie v United States, 
126 F.2d S33 and it has been given vitality in 
our opinions of recent years -- following the 
Supreme Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert v California, 
388 U.S. 263, 87 s.ct. 19Sl, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), 
Stovall v Denno, 388 U.S. 293, trilogy focusing on 
the very real danger of mistaken identification as 
a threat to justice. We refer to our post-Wade 
opinions in Gregory v United States, 369 F.2d 185 
(1966) and Macklin v United States, 409 F.2d 174 
(1969). These opinions sought to take into account 
the traditional recognition that identification 
testimony presents special problems of reliability 
by stressing the importance of an identification 
instruction even in cases meeting the constitutional 
threshold of admissibility. (footnotes omitted) 4 6'J 
F.2d at SSS. 
In State v Warren, supra, the court held that the model 
instruction from the Telfaire case was more appropriate than a 
general instruction dealing with an identi f ica ti on defense. 3 The 
Kansas court required the Telfaire instruction be given. 
3. The general instruction given in that case provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to be qi''• 
the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use that 
knowledge and experience which you possess in common with men 1" 
general in considering the testimony of each witness. You alsc 
take the following factors into consideration when weighing a 
witness' testimony: 
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In Utah, the instruction was cited with approval by 
.Jnslice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). In that case the majority opinion did not 
squarely address the issue of the requirement of such an instruc-
tion. The court did not find reversible error in the trial court's 
refusal to give the instruction. The primary reason the court gave 
for that holding was that defense counsel failed to take exception 
to the trial court's refusal to give the instruction. The court 
then stated, "we have not heretofore held that such an instruction 
is required. We believe the giving of it should be left to the 
discretion of the trial court" 649 P.2d at 61. Justice Stewart 
wrote a dissent to that part of the court's opinion and Justice 
Durham concurred in that dissent. 
3. (continued) 
(a) The witness' ability and opportunity to observe and 
knuw the things about which he had testified; 
(b) The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory; 
(c) The witness' manner and conduct while testifying; 
(d) Any interest the witness may have in the result of 
the trial; and 
(e) The reasonableness of the witness' testimony when 
considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and 
(f) Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness 
m3y ha 1 re. 
If you find that any witness has wilfully testified falsely 
concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust the 
testimony of that witness in other matters, and you may reject 
all or part of the testimony of that witness, or you may give it 
such weight as you think it deserves. You should not reject any 
testimony without cause." 635 P.2d at 1245. 
_, ')_ 
Previously, this court had decided that it was not revers. 
error to give an instruction similar to that given in 
supra, State v Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981). 1 , 
is interesting to note that State v Schaffer, supra, was note· 
cited in the Malmrose case. In Schaffer the court did not say 
there was no error in refusing to give the instruction, but 
the court reasoned that because other general instructions on 
credibility and burden of proof were given, the jury was adequate._ 
advised on what the law was. Secondly, the court noted that th''' 
were two eyewitnesses who had abundant opportunity to observe tc' 
defendant, thus alleviating any prejudice. The court conclude:; 
that the refusal to give the instruction did not constitute 
"reversible error" (emphasis added) 638 P. 2d at 1187. 
Similarly in State v Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) the 
issue of the refusal to give an instruction on eyewitness ider.u-
fication was raised. With respect to that issue this court state; 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if there is 
any substantial evidence to justify such an instruc-
tion. Where, however, the requested instruction is 
denied, no prejudicial error occurs if it appears th3" 
the giving of the requested instruction would not 
have affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover, 
a defendant is not entitled to an instruction 
is redundant or repetitive of principles enunciated 
in other instructions given to the jury. The pr :nc rp. 
points of defendant's proposed instruction dealt wit' 
the State's burden of proof and the factors to cons1C1' 
in weighing the testimony of an eyewitness. All 
these factors were adequately dealt with in other 
instructions presented to the jury by the trial cc,:1:: 
As a result, we cannot agree that the denial of the 
proposed instruction constituted reversible error." 
(footnote omitted) 622 P.2d at 359. 
The general conclusions that can be reached about these ca:eo 
are: First of all, this court has never said that such an insuc:· 
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d 
LJon is improper and should not be given. Secondly, the court 
has clearly implied that under certain circumstances the identity 
instruction would be proper. Finally, the court in all of these 
cases spoke in terms of no reversible error indicating that due 
to the nature of the cases, even though there may have been error, 
there was no prejudice to the appellants. 
Several other principles of Utah law which were dealt with 
only in passing or not mentioned at all in those cases must be 
discussed here. Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant is 
entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury in 
the form of written instructions, State v Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P. 
2d 1050 (1931), State v Mccumber, supra. With respect to defenses, 
a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that 
the defense need only raise a reasonable doubt. State v Wilson, 
565, P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) 
and State v Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981). The mere fact that the 
court gave general instructions on the presumption of innocence and 
burden of proof does not alleviate the prejudice in refusing to 
instruct the jury with respect to the defendant's burden in establish-
ing his defense. This court has held that a jury need not 
go through such a tortuous process when 
that result could have been achieved by giving 
the defendant's requested instruction, or one of 
that substance." State v Torres, supra at 696. 
In this case there was no instruction given which explained 
lo the jury what the defense was, nor was there any instruction 
41ven which explained to the jury what the burden of proof was with 
respect to a defense. The only instruction that was submitted 
Gn these issues was that which is the subject of this appeal. 
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consequently, it was error not to give an instruction explaininJ 
to the jury what the defense was, and relating that portion 
of the evidence to the reasonable doubt standard. The 
that support the giving of the Telfaire model instruction, 
discussed above, are substantial and compelling. That instruct 
is clearly a necessary and proper one and it was error to refuse 
to give it to the jury. 
The error in refusing to give the instruction on identificat:· 
was prejudicial requiring a new trial. A criminal conviction rr,us'. 
be reversed if there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would be different if the requested instruction had been given. 
State v Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). In the present cas;, 
the principal issue at trial was the identification of the 
as the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery. The teller never 
identified the appellant in court as the person who committed thE 
offense. (T-12-36). The identification that was made of the 
appellant was from a photographic array that the witness 
some two to three months after the commission of the crime. (T-82 
The only other identification evidence was that of Mrs. Cornia, ar· 
there was no evidence presented which proved other than by 
that the man she saw was the robber. The initial description of 
the robber given by Mr. Cosaert was very general. He was able to 
describe the clothing, height and weight of the perpetrator. rr" 
only distinguishing features he notices was that of lines arouri 
the eyes ( T-8 3) . Mr. Cosaert' s opportunity to observe the rot,L": 1 
was very limited. He stated that the robber passed him at the & 
and said "Excuse me." (T-93). That transaction as well as the 
opportunity to observe lasted only a matter of seconds. Addi tior 3· 
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Mr. eosaert was unaware at the time the robber passed him that he 
was the robber or that a robbery had taken place. (T-93,103). 
He would therefore, have had no reason to pay particular attention 
tu the individual. 
It is hard to imagine a case where there would be a greater 
need for an instruction describing what eyewitness identification 
evidence is, how it is to be evaluated, and the burden of proof 
it must meet. An instruction on how to evaluate eyewitness 
identification and how to weigh the evidence was necessary to 
inform the jury of the problems with the identification. If the 
instruction had been given, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the verdict would have been different. Consequently, the error 
was prejudicial and a new trial should be ordered. 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, and Article I, Section 12, the Constitution of 
the State of Utah, guarantees the right to counsel to an accused. 
State v McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1978) and State v Gray, 601 P.2d 
918 (Utah 1979), set forth the standard to measure the constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel in Utah. In State v McNicol 
the court stated that: 
"This court has previously held the right of 
the accused to have counsel if he is not 
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance 
in the record by an attorney who manifests no 
real concern about the interests of the accused. 
He is entitled to the assistance of a competent 
member of the Bar who shows a willingness to 
identify himself with the interest of the accused 
and presents such defenses as are available under 
the law and consistent with the ethics of the 
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profession." 
In the instant case, Defendant was denied his right tu 
effective assistance of counsel as a result of the fact thc1t 
defense counsel failed to subpoena additional witnesses that 
were available to testify that the Appellant was at the JoL 
site on February 5, 1981. Furthermore, counsel for Appellant 
failed to subpoena additional witnesses which were available 
to testify that a Mr. Paul Watson admitted to the commission of 
the robbery of Zion's Bank on February 5, 1981. 
Based upon the foregoing the Defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
********** 
In the instant case there is insufficient evidence as a 
matter of law to support Appellant's conviction for the reason 
that in viewing the evidence adduced at trial, reasonable minds 
must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the offense charged. The defense adduced at trial, 
independent corroborated evidence that Appellant was on a ]Ob 
site at the time of the commission of the robbery. Furthermore, 
the identification testimony of the State's witnesses is unrel1st:, 
and gives rise to an inference of reasonable doubt. 
the trial court's refusal to give Defendant's requested instrucuc: 
on identification testimony constituted prejudicial error unde·c ,,, 
circumstances and denied Appellant's right to due process of 
In conclusion, Appellant was denied effective assistance of cc• ir,cr 
DATED this /0 day of August, 1983. 
-17-Attorney for App0llant 
